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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last couple of years some ‘ecological economists’, as they 
call themselves, have proposed an „Index of Sustainable Economic 
Welfare“ (ISEW) as an alternative to a country’s Gross National 
Product (GNP) or Gross Domestic Product1 (GDP). ISEWs have been 
developed out of the concern that GNP is not an adequate indicator 
for either current welfare or the achievement of sustainability, which 
is usually defined as the capacity to provide non-declining future 
welfare. The main critiques have been that GNP is flawed because (a) 
it does not take the value of household labour, (b) the welfare effects 
of income inequality, and (c) the welfare loss due to environmental 
degradation into account and (d) considers ‘defensive expenditures’ 
wrongly as contributions to welfare. 
The ISEW is supposed to provide a remedy for these and a couple 
of other shortcomings in order to provide a more reliable monetary 
indicator of welfare and sustainability. It attempts to improve earlier 
measures of welfare such as Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) and Zolotas 
(1981)2. ISEW-studies have become increasingly popular recently and 
have prompted widespread attention3. Studies have been undertaken 
for the U.S. (Daly and Cobb 1989, Cobb and Cobb 1994), the United 
Kingdom (Jackson and Marks 1994; Jackson et al. 1997), Germany 
(Diefenbacher 1994), Italy (Guenno and Tiezzi 1996, preliminary 
study only), Sweden (Jackson and Stymne 1996) and Austria (Stock-
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hammer et al. 1997). What these studies usually show is that the 
ISEW of a country has been growing much slower since 1945 than 
her GNP and indeed has been fallen since the early 1980s. 
Computation of an ISEW usually starts from the value of personal 
consumption expenditures which is a sub-component of GDP since 
GDP = Personal consumption + Public consumption + Investment + 
(Exports - Imports). Consumption expenditures are weighted with 
an index of „distributional inequality“ of income (usually a modified 
Gini Coefficient). Then, certain welfare relevant contributions are 
added and certain welfare relevant losses are subtracted. As an ex-
ample take the U.S.-study of Cobb and Cobb (1994): After having 
weighted personal consumption expenditures by a modified Gini 
Coefficient of pre-tax income distribution data, they add the esti-
mates of the value of the services from household labour, consumer 
durables and streets and highways. They also add net private in-
vestment into man-made capital4 and changes in the net interna-
tional investment position of the U.S. They subtract most expendi-
tures on health and education because these are regarded as mostly 
defensive expenditures. They also subtract expenditures on con-
sumer durables, estimates of the costs of commuting, car accidents, 
and the costs of environmental degradation such as water, air and 
noise pollution, loss of wetlands and farmlands, the depletion of 
nonrenewable resources and long term environmental damages due 
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to CO2-emissions. The ISEW is simply the sum of the weighted per-
sonal consumption expenditures and all the mentioned corrections. 
In this article, I will argue first that the ISEWs lack a sound theo-
retical foundation. I will show second that their conclusions are 
highly dependent on certain key and rather arbitrary assumptions 
about the weighting of income distribution, the valuing of the deple-
tion of non-renewable resources and long-term environmental dam-
age and the neglect of technical progress and increases in human 
capital. Third, I will argue that the ISEWs and their authors in criti-
cising GNP for its deficiencies as an indicator of welfare miss the 
point since GNP was never thought of as providing this function by 
its founders. Finally I will show that the ISEWs rest on two methodo-
logical inconsistencies. One is that the ISEW meshes together the 
measurement of two entities, current welfare and sustainability, that 
should be kept separate. This is because an indicator of current wel-
fare ideally consists of items that are not relevant for questions of 
sustainability and vice versa. The second methodological inconsis-
tency is that although ISEWs are usually undertaken by economists 
who are in favour of some stronger version of sustainability (natural 
capital and certain of its sub-categories are regarded as being not 
amenable for substitution), the ISEW implicitly assumes perfect sub-
stitutability within natural capital and between natural and other 
forms of capital. 
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The concluding section draws policy implications out of the 
analysis. There I argue that it is erroneous to search for a single indi-
cator that commands enough general agreement to measure welfare 
and sustainability. Scarce time and resources should be put into de-
veloping new and improving existing indicators of the quality of life 
that all fall well short of trying to provide one single and clear-cut 
measure of welfare and sustainability. At the same time, it should be 
constantly warned against misinterpreting GNP as an indicator of 
welfare. 
 
A SHORT REVIEW OF ISEW-STUDIES 
As mentioned, ISEW-studies have been undertaken for a couple of 
high income countries. The detailed methodology varies somewhat 
from study to study depending on the authors’ preferences and the 
availability of data. The methodology of the German (Diefenbacher 
1994), Italian (Guenno and Tiezzi 1996), Swedish (Jackson and 
Stymne 1996), and early UK-study (Jackson and Marks 1994) is basi-
cally the same as in Cobb and Cobb (1994) which is itself a revision 
and update of the pioneering U.S. study in Daly and Cobb (1989). 
The update of the UK-study (Jackson et al. 1997) and the study for 
Austria (Stockhammer et al. 1997) have undertaken some changes in 
methodology as we will see later on. Importantly, the basic conclu-
sions are the same for all these studies: Welfare has risen much 
slower than growth rates of GNP would suggest and, indeed, has 
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fallen from the 1980s onwards. Jackson et al. (1997, p. 2) cite Max-
Neef (1995, p. 116) who suggests that the computation of an ISEW for 
various countries provides evidence for a „threshold hypothesis“ 
which holds „that for every country, economic growth (as conven-
tionally measured) brings about an improvement in the quality of 
life, but only up to a point - the threshold point beyond which more 
economic growth leads to a decline in the quality of life.“ 
For the U.S., e.g., covering the period 1950 to 1990, the ISEW is al-
ready slightly declining during the 1970s by 0.14% per year — a de-
cline that is accelerating to 1.26% per year in the 1980s according to 
Cobb and Cobb (1994, p. 76). They suggest resource depletion, long-
term environmental damage and a more unequal income distribution 
as the main factors for the decline in the ISEW. 
For Germany, basically the same trend is detected covering the 
period 1950 to 1987: Diefenbacher (1994, p. 228) finds after 1980 „on-
going growth of the GNP, but a rather sharp decline of the ISEW“. 
He provides basically the same reasons for this decline in the Ger-
man ISEW in the 1980s as Cobb and Cobb (1994) do for the U.S.. 
Jackson and Marks (1994, p. 28) in a pilot study for the UK found 
that over the period 1950 to 1990 „there is virtually no overall 
growth“ and the „per capita ISEW in 1990 is just 3% higher than it 
was in 1950“. This dismal performance is mainly due to the 1980s for 
which Jackson and Marks (1994, p. 29) compute a decline in ISEW 
per capita of 4.7% p.a.! They cite rising income inequality and envi-
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ronmental degradation as major reasons for this dramatic decline in 
the last decade of their period of analysis (p. 32). 
In the updated study, Jackson et al. (1997), the period up until 
1996 is covered. As mentioned, the methodology for the computation 
of the revised index has somewhat changed from Jackson and Marks 
(1994). The two main changes are as follows: 
• Income inequality is measured via computing a so-called Atkinson 
income instead of using a modified Gini coefficient. The Atkinson 
income indicates „the proportion of the present total income that 
would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare as at 
present if incomes where equally distributed“ (Atkinson 1983, p. 
57). In varying an explicit parameter for aversion against inequal-
ity in income distribution, the valuation of income inequality is 
undertaken explicitly rather than implicitly as is the case with the 
Gini coefficient. 
• Following the methodology of Cobb and Cobb (1994), Jackson and 
Marks (1994, p. 24) computed accumulating long-term environ-
mental damage by valuing each tonne of coal equivalent of non-
renewable fuels consumed in the UK with a constant, rather arbi-
trary rate of £3.73 (1985 pounds Sterling)5. Jackson et al. (1997) in-
stead use explicit cost estimates for long-term environmental 
damage from global warming. Starting from an estimate of about 
£11 marginal costs per tonne of carbon emitted in 1990, they com-
pute the costs per tonne of carbon in retrospect and up to 1996 
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under the assumption that marginal social costs of carbon emis-
sion rise over time according to the cumulative level of emissions 
from past activities. As Cobb and Cobb (1994) did, Jackson et al. 
(1997) let the costs from long-term damage accumulate over time 
which is inappropriate since they use marginal damage costs for 
valuing CO2-emissions. 
In spite of these changes in methodology, Jackson et al. (1997) come 
to the same basic conclusions as Jackson and Marks (1994). Mayo, 
MacGillivray and McLaren (1997, p. 1), the short version to Jackson 
et al. (1997), detect that „since 1980, according to the ISEW, real well-
being has actually fallen by over 20 per cent“. As key reasons for this 
decline they cite „environmental degradation (in particular depletion 
of non-renewable resources and long-term environmental damage) 
and income inequality“ (p. 5). The decline in welfare shown by the 
updated ISEW is slightly smaller than the one detected by the pilot 
ISEW of Jackson and Marks (1994). „The principal reason for this has 
been the choice of a relatively low aversion to income inequality“ 
(Jackson et al. 1997, p. 34). 
For Austria, Stockhammer et al. (1997, p. 32), covering the period 
1955 to 1992, come up with similar findings as the other studies. In 
addition, they cite the substitution of household work with market 
production as a major reason for the widening gap between GNP 
and the ISEW: the substitution increases GNP but not the ISEW since 
Stockhammer et al. (1997, p. 26) value the contribution of household 
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labour to welfare in the ISEW according to market prices. The meth-
odology Stockhammer et al. (1997) use is different in many respects 
from Cobb and Cobb (1994). The main changes are as follows: 
• Instead of weighting the starting point, personal consumption ex-
penditures, by a „distribution inequality index“, it is the final 
item, the ISEW, that is weighted for changes in income distribu-
tion. 
• All investment items are multiplied by the productivity of capital 
in order to convert capital stocks into consumption flows. 
• Most defensive expenditures are computed as the expenditures 
exceeding the level in the base year 1955. The idea is that 1955 
represents something close to a sustainable level. 
• For air and water pollution potential defensive costs are taken into 
account as well. Stockhammer et al. (1997, p. 23) define potential 
defensive costs as „those costs that would have occurred if society 
had reacted to environmental devaluation in the same way (con-
cerning one ‘unit of pollution’) as it reacts today.“ 
• Whereas Cobb and Cobb (1994) valued the depletion of non-
renewable resources by replacement costs for renewable re-
sources, Stockhammer et al. (1997) valued this item as the value 
added of the mining sector. Long-term environmental damage is 
valued similar to Jackson et al. (1997). 
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A CRITIQUE OF THE ISEW 
 
LACKING THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
One of the most fundamental problems of an ISEW is that it lacks 
a sound theoretical foundation. The corrections are simply under-
taken without giving any theoretically sound justification for doing 
so. The correction terms, e.g. those for the depletion of non-
renewable resources and the cost of long-term environmental dam-
age, are not derived from a dynamic optimisation model which 
would be able to provide a theoretically sound indicator of welfare 
(Hartwick 1990). The same applies to corrections such as for the de-
crease in welfare due to traffic costs, health care, environmental pol-
lution and other expenditures that allegedly only function as a ‘de-
fence’ against a decline in welfare. More formal modelling has shown 
that defensive expenditures should not be netted out of consumption 
expenditures to arrive at an indicator of welfare (Mäler 1991, Hamil-
ton 1994, 1996). 
The ISEW can also be criticised to be arbitrary in the components 
it includes or (implicitly) excludes as contributors to welfare. One 
prominent item, defensive expenditures, provides a case in point. 
The concept of defensive expenditures is very dubious and elusive 
since it is rather arbitrary what should count as defensive. This ar-
gument applies both to the question of what should count as envi-
ronmentally defensive expenditures and to what should count as 
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defensive expenditures in general. If health expenditures are defen-
sive expenditures against illness, why should food and drinking ex-
penditures not count as defensive expenditures against hunger and 
thirst? Are holiday and entertainment expenditures defensive ex-
penditures against boredom? Should they all be subtracted from con-
sumption expenditures? As the revised system of national accounts 
rightly retorts: „Pushed to its logical conclusion, scarcely any con-
sumption improves welfare in this line of argument.“ (United Na-
tions 1993, p. 14). 
More generally, what determines welfare is open to everybody’s 
own subjective judgement. If you include a correction term for in-
come inequality, why not include a correction term for the degree of 
political freedom, a correction term for the extent of crime or a cor-
rection term for the degree of equality between the sexes? And how 
do you provide a reliable estimate of these correction terms? 
 
RESULTS DEPENDING ON ARBITRARY ASSUMPTIONS 
To substantiate the critique that the results of the ISEWs depend 
on arbitrary assumptions, let us have a closer look at the two main 
determinants of the decline in the ISEWs, namely environmental 
degradation and ‘worsening’ income distribution. 
Let us start with the latter first: The valuation of the distribution 
of income fails to command general agreement. Mishan (1994, p. 172) 
is right in noting that „all efforts to adjust the welfare index to ac-
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commodate changes in distribution (...)  must be regarded with mis-
givings. They are either arbitrary or politically biased and are, there-
fore, invariably a focus of attack.“ Of course, not undertaking any 
explicit valuation is tantamount to assuming implicitly that the mar-
ginal utility of income is constant and the same for the rich and the 
poor alike - an assumption no less arbitrary than the one embraced 
by the proponents of an ISEW. The fact that the weighting for income 
distribution exerts a big influence on the ISEW should caution 
against adjustments for changes in distribution, however. In Cobb 
and Cobb (1994), e.g., the ISEW for 1990 would be 12% higher with-
out adjustments for income distribution. In Jackson et al. (1997) per 
capita ISEW between 1973 and 1996 is declining by 13.4% if income is 
weighted by the inequality index, but is rising by 7.8% without ad-
justment for changes in distribution. It follows that with appropriate 
weighting widely differing conclusions can be drawn. 
As far as the ISEW is supposed to measure sustainability, i.e. the 
capacity to provide future welfare, it should be noted that the distri-
bution of income at any given point of time does not directly im-
pinge upon the capacity to provide future welfare: First, it is not 
clear a priori that a more equal society is more apt to secure non-
declining future welfare. Torras and Boyce (1997, p. 9) find in an 
econometric cross-section study of the determinants of environ-
mental quality that, contrary to their expectation, higher income ine-
quality sometimes tends to improve environmental quality. Also, 
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sustainability can be hampered by a more equal income distribution. 
Generally, future welfare is increased by raising current savings. 
How to do this? Since rich people usually have a higher marginal 
propensity to save than poor people, one way could be to redistrib-
ute income from currently poor to rich people. Hence, the goals of 
intra- and inter-generational distribution can conflict with each other. 
Second, there is no direct link between the distribution of income 
and sustainability. The personal income distribution can change 
quite dramatically over a course of, say, two or three generations and 
the current income distribution is almost irrelevant for a representa-
tive member of a future generation who is likely to be more con-
cerned about whether the current generation strives for sustainability 
than about the current income distribution. 
As concerns long-term environmental damage, the computations 
are largely dependent on highly disputable ad hoc-assumptions. 
Cobb and Cobb (1994, p. 266), e.g., value the consumption of a do-
mestically produced barrel of oil or its equivalent in 1988 with 
75 US$, because that is the presumed cost of replacing the barrel with 
renewable energy from biomass. For other years the replacement 
costs are computed in retrospect and are forwarded under the as-
sumption that they rise at the constant rate of 3% p.a. over time. If 
you think 75 US$ is not much, compare it to the costs of importing a 
barrel of oil from abroad which is about 20 US$. Or compare it to the 
cost of providing solar energy in a couple of decades when U.S. non-
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renewable energy resources are depleted which will certainly be 
much less than 75 US$ and is decreasing over time, not increasing, as 
technical progress makes renewable resource use cheaper. Also, 
Cobb and Cobb (1994, p. 267) arbitrarily assume that the consump-
tion of each barrel of oil or its equivalent causes accumulating envi-
ronmental damage costs of 0.50 US$ due to CO2-emissions and that 
the production of each kilogram of CFC-11 and CFC-12 causes accu-
mulating damage of 15 US$ (p. 273). Without the corrections for the 
depletion of non-renewable resources, long-term environmental 
damage and ozone depletion the ISEW in 1990 would be 83.5% 
higher! These items are so large in magnitude that they dominate 
any other subtraction terms by one or two orders of magnitude. 
Figure 1 provides some sensitivity analyses for the U.S. ISEW. 
There are six graphs, all are presented in per capita terms and con-
stant 1972 US$ to relate to Cobb and Cobb (1994). For lack of data, 
only the period 1970 to 1990 is covered. The lowest graph plots the 
ISEW as presented in Cobb and Cobb (1994). 
 
<<< INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE >>> 
 
The dotted line called US-ISEW2 uses a different methodology for 
computing the depletion of non-renewable resources and long-term 
environmental damage than Cobb and Cobb (1994). It is computed as 
follows: Instead of arbitrary replacement costs for non-renewable 
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resources, US-ISEW2 subtracts total Hotelling rents from consump-
tion expenditures. Total Hotelling rents are the product of price mi-
nus average cost and resource depletion/harvest6: (P-AC)*R. Theo-
retical modelling (e.g. Hamilton 1994, 1996) shows that this is a rea-
sonable correction term to account for resource depletion/harvest, 
derived from a dynamic optimisation model. Data are taken from 
World Bank (1997a). Note that US-ISEW2 is covering more non-
renewable resources than Cobb and Cobb (1994) because it takes the 
depletion of mineral resources into account as well, not only energy 
resources. It encompasses Hotelling rents from oil, natural gas, hard 
coal, brown coal, bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, zinc, phosphate, 
tin, gold, silver and forests7. As concerns long-term environmental 
damage, US-ISEW2 values annual CO2-emissions at 20 US$ per met-
ric tonne carbon instead of arbitrarily assuming that each barrel of oil 
equivalent causes accumulating damage of 0.50$. Theoretical model-
ling (e.g. Hamilton 1994, 1996) again shows that this is a reasonable 
correction term to account for damage caused by CO2-emissions. The 
20 US$ is taken from Fankhauser (1995) and is often regarded as a 
consensus estimate for the marginal cost of CO2-emissions. Data are 
again taken from World Bank (1997a). Since marginal costs are used, 
the damage costs are not accumulated over time. 
The graph marked by the small triangles called US-ISEW3 is like 
US-ISEW2, but with the further change that consumption expendi-
tures are not weighted with an index of distribution inequality. It is 
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apparent from the graphs that US-ISEW2 and even more so US-
ISEW3 are not only much higher than US-ISEW, but also follow the 
shape of US-GNP (per capita GNP, the graph marked with squares) 
rather closely. Instead of declining slightly over time as US-ISEW 
does, both US-ISEW2 and US-ISEW3 increase over time. 
Hence, changing two sensitive parameters in Cobb and Cobb’s 
(1994) methodology completely changes the presented picture about 
the changes in welfare and sustainability. US-ISEW2 is certainly to be 
preferred to US-ISEW on theoretical grounds since its correction 
terms for resource depletion and environmental damage are derived 
from modelling and not arbitrarily chosen. Whether US-ISEW3 
should be preferred to US-ISEW2 depends on how you value distri-
bution inequality. 
Both US-ISEW2 and US-ISEW3 are still below US-GNP. This is 
because of the 14 items Cobb and Cobb (1994) subtract from personal 
consumption expenditures, I have only changed one (ISEW2) or two 
(ISEW3), respectively. Yet another criticism is that the ISEWs are 
constructed in a way that prompts one to suspect that their very aim 
is to show that welfare is lower than GNP and has risen much more 
slowly than indicated by GNP or has even fallen — e.g. by excluding 
investment into human capital and technical progress from their 
measurement (Eisner 1994, Atkinson 1995). Another correction that 
could be undertaken and would likely raise the ISEW considerably is 
adjusting for improved quality of consumer goods over time. 
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As concerns investment into human capital, Cobb and Cobb 
(1994, p. 53) exclude most expenditures for education because they 
believe that education „contributes little to productivity“ and should 
hence not be counted as investment. On the other hand, Cobb and 
Cobb believe that education should not count as consumption either 
since „most schooling appears to be defensive. In other words, peo-
ple attend school because others are in school and the failure to at-
tend would mean falling behind in the competition for diplomas or 
degrees that confer higher incomes on their recipients.“ As a conse-
quence, only one-half of post-secondary education is counted as pure 
consumption (Cobb and Cobb 1994, p. 54). 
That education contributes little to productivity is at odds with 
most studies of the determinants of long-run growth (World Bank 
1995, p. 62) which usually hold that „human capital is the most criti-
cal factor of production“ (Eisner 1994, p. 99). In the graph with the 
small crosses called US-ISEW4 in figure 1, education expenditures 
have therefore been fully added to US-ISEW38. As can be seen in 
comparison to US-ISEW2, the level of welfare and sustainability is 
considerably higher with the inclusion of education expenditures. 
As concerns technical progress, Weitzman and Löfgren (1997) 
have estimated the upward-correction to an indicator of sustainabil-
ity due to expected future technical progress. For the U.S. they esti-
mate that sustainable income in 1987 is about 40% higher than GNP. 
The exact magnitude of this estimate is dependent on a series of cru-
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cial assumptions (see Weitzman and Löfgren 1997) and should not be 
given too much credit. More for illustrative purposes therefore, I 
have simply assumed that the estimate is correct and of the same 
magnitude for the rest of the period 1970 to 1990. The upper graph in 
figure 1 with the black diamonds called US-ISEW5 plots the graph 
US-ISEW4 augmented by 40%. For every year, US-ISEW5 lies above 
US-GNP and would thus signal a higher achievement of sustainabil-
ity. 
Figure 2 provides an analogous analysis for the UK ISEW. All 
graphs are again in per capita terms, but constant 1990 pounds Ster-
ling. The lowest graph plots the ISEW as presented in Jackson et al. 
(1997). The graph with the squares represents GDP. All other graphs 
are computed analogous to the analysis for the U.S. For simplicity 
and lack of a different data it is assumed that the upward correction 
factor for technical progress is also 40%. The conclusions for this sen-
sitivity analysis are quite similar: UK-ISEW2, UK-ISEW3 and UK-
ISEW4 move rather close with UK-GDP. There is a growing gap be-
tween these modified ISEWs and the original UK-ISEW of Jackson et 
al. (1997). Again more for illustrative purposes, UK-ISEW5 takes ac-
count of the beneficial effects of technical progress which raises UK-
ISEW4 by 40% and lies above UK-GDP in every year. 
 
<<<< INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE >>> 
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To conclude, with different assumptions about weighting of the 
income distribution, the corrections for the depletion of non-
renewable resources and long-term environmental damage and the 
inclusion of the positive effects of human capital formation and tech-
nical progress, one gets a completely different picture of a society’s 
welfare and achievement of sustainability. 
 
GNP/GDP IS NOT AN INDICATOR OF WELFARE 
Sometimes one gets the impression, however, that the construc-
tors of ISEW-measures are not bothered very much by the subjectiv-
ity of the numbers they produce, as becomes clear in the following 
quotation taken from Cobb and Cobb (1994, p. 252): „The point is 
rather that when the GNP functions politically as a welfare measure, 
it should not be allowed to masquerade as a measure that is some-
how more objective than alternative ways of determining well-
being.“ 
It has to be conceded that Herman Daly, one of the first propo-
nents of an ISEW, is aware of the many criticisms that can be raised 
against the ISEW. At the same time, however, he claims that it is a 
much better indicator of welfare and sustainability than GNP and is 
thus justified: „Of course we had to make many arbitrary judge-
ments, but in our opinion no more arbitrary than those made in 
standard GNP accounting — in fact less so. (...) We have no illusions 
that our index is really an accurate measure of sustainable economic 
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welfare... We did not offer the ISEW as the proper goal of economic 
policy — it too has flaws. If GNP were a cigarette, then the ISEW 
would be that cigarette with a charcoal filter.“ (Daly 1996, p. 97f.). 
Similarly, Stockhammer et al. (1997, p. 33) argue that „the ISEW 
seems qualified to kick GDP from the throne as leading indicator for 
economic policy“ while acknowledging that „it is not ready to usurp 
that throne“. 
The proponents of an ISEW rightly argue that GNP rests on 
highly artificial and dubious assumptions as well, e.g. in valuing 
public services at factor costs and ignoring household labour. And it 
is definitely a very bad indicator of welfare, especially in an inter-
temporal context encompassing future generations9. It takes little 
account of the contribution of natural capital to economic activity 
and welfare and of the reverse impact of the economy on the envi-
ronment. Sometimes it is directly misleading as an indicator of wel-
fare, e.g. when higher expenditures for the clean-up of rising pollu-
tion are counted as an increase in GNP. The same holds true when 
the liquidation of a capital stock, be it natural or not, is counted as an 
addition to value although capital consumption will eventually lead 
to economic decline. Also, it makes no attempt whatsoever to value 
environmental externalities. This is to be conceded. 
But it has to be kept in mind that GNP/GDP was never supposed 
to be an indicator of welfare and that it fulfils quite well the function 
it was supposed to accomplish when it was established after the Sec-
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ond World War: To provide an indicator for macroeconomic stabili-
sation policy of the economic activity in a country (Hamilton et al. 
1994, p 7), i.e. an indicator of the total output produced by the econ-
omy10. The revised system of national accounts states this with un-
ambiguous clarity: „Neither gross nor net domestic product is a 
measure of welfare. Domestic product is an indicator of overall pro-
duction activity“ (United Nations 1993, p. 41). And „total welfare 
could fall even though GDP could increase in volume terms“ (ibid., 
p. 14). 
It was not the economists, but the politicians and the journalists 
who interpreted GNP wrongly as an indicator of welfare. To be cor-
rect, there was some debate among economists by the time the na-
tional accounts were built up, but as Cobb and Cobb (1994, p. 20) 
admit, „those who wanted to measure production won out over 
those who believed that the national accounts should measure wel-
fare“. That is not to say that economists are completely innocent as 
concerns the misinterpretation of GNP. Although they have usually 
not supported the misinterpretation of GNP as a welfare indicator, it 
is true that they are devoted to provide measures against a downfall 
in GNP or, better, for triggering higher growth in GNP11. Also, in 
dealing with complex issues such as global warming, they occasion-
ally equate welfare with consumption growth which is represented 
by GNP (see, for example, Nordhaus 1991). In this respect, Cobb and 
Cobb (1994, p. 250) are right in saying that „as long as GNP is treated 
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by economists as the ‘central framework’ (...), political leaders and 
the media will continue to view the GNP as a measure of welfare.“ 
But what should the ensuing conclusion be? My argument is that it 
would be a mistake to conclude that we are in need of an alternative 
single indicator of welfare and sustainability. This reasoning is 
spelled out in detail in the concluding section. Let us first look at an-
other criticism of the ISEW, however. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL INCONSISTENCIES 
The authors of ISEWs commit the mistake of methodological in-
consistency in two respects: 
 
1) Contrary to what their authors think, the ISEW can not at the 
same time function both as an indicator of current welfare and an 
indicator of sustainability, i.e. the capacity to provide non-declining 
welfare over time. This is because the ISEW consists or should ideally 
consist of items that should only be included in an indicator of cur-
rent welfare or only in an indicator of sustainability. I have argued 
already that while distributional inequality might be important for 
current welfare, its link to sustainability is rather weak. Another ex-
ample for an item that should ideally be included in a welfare meas-
ure but not in an indicator of sustainability is leisure time. The ISEWs 
usually neglect the valuation of leisure time because doing so 
„would so totally swamp all other figures in such an index as to 
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make every other aspect of welfare trivial by comparison“ (Cobb and 
Cobb 1994, p. 275) – at least if leisure time is valued by an average 
wage rate, as is commonly done. Cobb and Cobb (1994, p. 275) real-
ise, however, that there „is no particular reason within economic 
theory“ for not including leisure time in a welfare indicator. But the 
valuation of leisure time has no direct link whatsoever to sustainabil-
ity. An increase in the wage rate or a decrease in working hours 
would raise the valuation of leisure time, but would not increase the 
capacity to provide future welfare. 
Reversely, there are many items that are relevant for a sustain-
ability but not for a welfare indicator. The depletion of non-
renewable resources and long-term environmental damage due to 
CO2-emissions, while diminishing sustainability, does not affect cur-
rent welfare. The same holds true for expected technical progress. 
The lesson is that one needs at least two indicators to measure 
two related, but distinct entities. Doing otherwise leads to methodo-
logical inconsistencies. 
 
2) The ISEW does not fulfil the objective it was originally con-
structed for. It has originally been proposed by ‘ecological econo-
mists’ who are in favour of a ‘strong’ version of sustainability (Daly 
1992, 1996; Daly and Cobb 1989). Strong sustainability has been de-
veloped as an opposing critique to ‘weak sustainability’ which as-
sumes that natural capital is perfectly substitutable through other 
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forms of capital (Solow 1974, 1993a,b; Hartwick 1977, 1990). Weak 
sustainability requires keeping the aggregate total value of man-
made capital and natural capital at least constant to ensure non-
declining welfare over time. Natural capital can be safely run down 
as long as enough other forms of capital are built up in exchange. 
Strong sustainability instead calls for keeping both the aggregate to-
tal value of man-made, natural and other forms of capital and the 
total value of natural capital itself at least constant. 
The proponents of strong sustainability have postulated some 
management rules as a kind of rule of thumb to put their concept 
into practice. Those rules are: 
 
• Use renewable resources such that its stock does not deteriorate. 
That is: Harvest at maximum the maximum sustainable yield. 
• Decrease the use of non-renewable resources as far as possible and 
replace their use with renewable resources (subject to the first rule, 
of course). 
• Maximise the efficiency of resource use and the recycling of re-
sources. 
• Use the environment as a sink for pollution such that its natural 
absorptive capacity does not deteriorate over time. 
 
Strictly speaking, as the management rules make clear, proponents of 
strong sustainability want even more than keeping the total value of 
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natural capital at least constant. What they want, in effect, is keeping 
the total value of three sub-categories of natural capital constant: first 
the aggregate of renewable resources, second the aggregate of re-
newable and non-renewable resources and third the aggregate of 
pollution-absorptive-capacity. 
What is really surprising, however, is that the ISEW does not ex-
plicitly distinguish sub-indices for different forms of total capital (e.g. 
man-made and natural capital) and different forms of natural capital 
(e.g. renewable and non-renewable resources), but eventually com-
putes one overall index only. This meshing together of values from 
natural and other forms of capital amounts to a conceptual break 
since the heart of the concept of strong sustainability demands that 
natural capital itself and even sub-categories of natural capital are 
held constant. Ironically, the ISEW does not measure strong sustain-
ability, but weak sustainability at best since it assumes perfect substi-
tutability among different forms of capital12! 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
For policy purposes concerning welfare and sustainability it would 
be important to have relevant and reliable indicators. Unfortunately, 
the weaknesses of the foundations on which the ISEW rest discredits 
its policy relevance. 
As Thage (1989, p. 319 and 329) observes, even the NNP, which 
subtracts depreciation of man-made capital from GNP and is there-
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fore closer to a welfare concept than GNP, is hardly used nationally 
or internationally due to the uncertainty about the estimates of de-
preciation of man-made capital. For most developing countries no 
NNP-figures are available at all. Instead, the GNP (that is: without 
depreciation of man-made capital) is used widely, even in contexts 
where use of NNP would theoretically be appropriate, e.g. in studies 
of value addition within industries. Thage concludes that adding fur-
ther correction terms to arrive at an indicator of welfare would be 
politically irrelevant: „Nobody would pay any attention if a further 
reduction of this concept was made“ (Thage 1989, p. 329). This might 
be too strong a conclusion, but doubts remain about the policy rele-
vance of an ISEW-measure that necessarily rests on arbitrary as-
sumptions and can be shown to be invalid as a reliable indicator for 
welfare and sustainability. 
Daly (1996, p. 115) acknowledges the difficulties in constructing a 
better indicator of welfare, but sees the ISEW justified by preferring 
„even the poorest approximation to the correct concept“ to „an accu-
rate approximation to an irrelevant or erroneous concept“ while at 
the same time conceding that „the mere existence of any numerical 
index of welfare is a standing invitation to the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness“ (ibid. p. 98). Similarly, Sheng (1995, p. 10f.) in a study 
for the World Wide Fund for Nature calls for integrating „environ-
mental ad resource values into the core“ of the current system of na-
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tional accounts until the system itself together with „its indicators 
such as GDP are completely abolished“. 
Richter (1993, p. 308), on the contrary, suggests that instead of 
constructing a dubious alternative welfare indicator all activities 
should be devoted to facilitate the proper interpretation of GNP. Per-
sonally, I doubt whether one could succeed in preventing policy-
makers and the general public from misusing GNP as a welfare indi-
cator. Now, that the welfare interpretation of GNP has become abso-
lute folklore and a common place it might be too late to start warning 
against a misinterpretation of GNP. But that is not an argument in 
favour of constructing another measure that requires even more 
carefulness in interpretation. Richter (1993, p. 309) is right in arguing 
that „if national accountants have failed to inform decision makers 
and the broad public about the scope and limits of the indicators they 
provide, can they really hope that the users will avoid the crucial 
problems of misinterpretation in the case of an intellectually much 
more demanding expanded system which comprises observed facts 
and sophisticated model results?“. 
The problem with the ISEW is not so much the imperfections of 
its components — in some way or other every social indicator is im-
perfect. The problem rather is that it promises to measure something, 
namely current welfare and sustainability, that cannot reliably be 
measured in one indicator, because hugely differing measures are 
equally plausible or, for that matter, implausible in methodology and 
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results. Therefore, the ISEW cannot even serve as a reasonably good 
first order approximation for measuring current welfare and sustain-
ability. 
I suspect that the reason why so much effort is put into attempts 
to measure an ISEW is an understandable but misplaced desire to 
arrive at a single number and at a clear-cut indicator for current wel-
fare and sustainability. With appropriate assumptions one can al-
ways produce some figures. In doing so, researchers fall into the trap 
of misplaced concreteness: their desire for a single clear-cut indicator 
is so strong that, consciously or not, they repress the insurmounting 
problems of arriving at the ‘correct’, and not just any, number. They 
ignore that current welfare and sustainability are entities much too 
complex that they could be dealt with by a single indicator. As 
Common (1993, p. 10f.) rightly notes: „Indeed, it could be argued 
that the pursuit of such a measure is counterproductive, in so far as it 
mis-represents the nature of the sustainability problem.“ Richter 
(1994, p. 218) therefore calls attempts to construct alternative welfare 
indicators futile „shadow boxing“ that waste scarce time and re-
sources. 
In the end, sticking to GNP and warning against misinterpreting it as 
an indicator of welfare for me seems to be the best conclusion one 
can draw. That is not to say that further research and effort should 
not be undertaken to improve existing and develop new indicators of 
welfare. A whole set of indicators are existent already, many of 
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which have been published and extensively discussed in this journal. 
What should be abolished, however, is the misplaced and misleading 
belief that there can be one single indicator that measures both cur-
rent welfare and sustainability and commands enough general 
agreement to brush away GNP in the attention of policy makers and 
the public. Carson and Young (1994, p. 112) — one the Director, the 
other Chief Statistician of the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce — are right in arguing that „a single-
dimension aggregate measure of sustainable welfare will be of little 
direct use in guiding, shaping, or choosing among government poli-
cies because the factors determining welfare cannot be reduced and 
combined into a single measure that would command widespread 
agreement and acceptance. In this respect, a measure of welfare dif-
fers from the GNP.“ 
As concerns the welfare impact of environmental changes, even 
one of the major pioneers of deriving a theoretically correct measure 
of sustainability admits that „we will have to continue relying on 
physical and other special indicators to a large extent in order to 
judge the performance of the economy with respect to the use of en-
vironmental resources“ (Mäler 1991, p. 1). As concerns sustainability, 
Robert Solow (1993b, p. 180), on whose work the concept of weak 
sustainability is based upon, realises that „sustainability is an essen-
tially vague concept, and it would be wrong to think of it as being 
precise, or even capable of being made precise. It is therefore proba-
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bly not in any clear way an exact guide to policy“. This conclusion is 
shared by Norgaard (1994, p. 22) who states that „it is impossible to 
define sustainable development in an operational manner in the de-
tail and with the level of control presumed in the logic of moder-
nity“, and by Folke and Kaberger (1991, p. 289) who state that „it is 
not meaningful to measure the absolute sustainability of a society at 
any point of time“. 
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ENDNOTES 
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search Programme (Environment and Climate) is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 The difference between GNP and GDP is that GDP includes output produced by 
foreigners within a country and excludes output produced by nationals abroad. 
The difference is usually quite small. Whenever I speak of GNP in the following, 
strictly speaking it should read GNP/GDP. 
2 For an overview of early attempts to provide a monetary welfare indicator see 
Eisner (1988). 
3 The updated UK-study, e.g., made frontpage headline news (Jackson et al. 1997, 
foreword). 
4 Man-made capital here means produced capital as defined in the conventional 
system of national accounts. 
5 The idea behind letting the costs accumulate over time is as follows: Cobb and 
Cobb (1994, p. 74)  „imagined that a tax or rent of $0.50 per barrel-equivalent had 
been levied on all non-renewable energy consumed during that period and set 
aside to accumulate in a non-interest-bearing account (...). That account might be 
thought of as a fund available to compensate future generations for the long-term 
damage (...).“ 
6 Strictly speaking, Hotelling rents are defined in terms of marginal costs. The more 
readily available average costs are used as a proxy to marginal costs. Note that the 
value of resource depletion is higher with average than with marginal costs which 
gives the US-ISEW2 graph a downward bias. 
7 For more detail on the data see World Bank (1997b) and Kunte et al. (1997). 
8 Counting all current education expenditures (including teachers’ salaries, expen-
ditures on textbooks etc.) as contributions towards increasing the stock of human 
capital is likely to overestimate this item somewhat. Hence, the US-ISEW4 graph is 
somewhat biased upwards. 
9 However, Daly’s (1996, p. 112) claim that GNP bears no closer relation to welfare 
than the stock of gold bullion did in the age of mercantilism is vastly overdrawn. 
As Beckerman (1995, p. 108f.) rightly retorts: If this was true, why do people almost 
always migrate towards countries with a higher GNP and rarely vice versa? Also, 
as Dasgupta (1990) and Dasgupta and Weale (1992) show, at least in poor countries 
GNP is highly correlated with basic indicators of the quality of life such as life ex-
pectancy, infant mortality, adult literacy and indices of political and civil rights. 
10 It has to be conceded, however, that it does so rather imperfectly in developing 
countries where, often, much of the economic activity in the so-called informal 
 39 
                                                                                                                            
sectors is not taken into account. Also, mainly only marketed economic activity is 
included since domestic and personal services produced and consumed by mem-
bers of the same household or provided without payment are omitted In addition, 
economic activity in the black market is by its very nature not included in 
GNP/GDP. 
11 Note, however, that this concern can be justified by the close link between 
changes in GNP and government revenue, employment etc., i.e. without recourse 
to welfare. 
12 Jackson and Marks (1994, p. 35), the authors of the early UK-study, acknowledge 
the limitedness of the index they compute: „On the other hand, a level of welfare 
which burdens future generations with a polluted environment, depleted re-
sources, and social disintegration, cannot be said to be sustainable, even if it is 
measured at a lower value than the wealth that created it. (..) It is not our conten-
tion therefore that the UK-ISEW reflects a level of welfare intended to ensure the 
future sustainability of the economic and social system. (...) Rather, we suggest that 
the ISEW should be regarded only as a de minimus indicator of the sustainability 
or unsustainability of past actions, and not as any kind of insurance policy against 
the future.“ 
